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31  January  1984 I  an most  grateful  to  you  Hr.  Chairman  and  to  the 
Farm and  Industrial Equipment  Institute for  giving me 
this opportunity of saying  a  few  \lOrds  to  you  on  such 
an  important topic  - one  with implications not only 
for  European  farmers  but also for American  agriculture 
and  for tleseimportant sectors of American  agribusiness 
represented here  today. 
1. 
I  propose  spending the  time  alloted to  me  this morning 
on  European  agricultural policy  - where it has  got and  the 
course plotted for its future. 
As  most of you will  know,  the  European  Community 
has  operated its own  farm policy  - the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy or  CAP  - for  the last 20  years or so,  and  I  imagine 
that you will also appreciate its great importance not 
only to our  8  million  farmers  bu~ also 
to all 270  million Europeans  living in our  10  Member  States. 
The  objectives of the  CAP  - set out in the  Treaty of 
Rome  - can  be  summarised  as  follows 
- to  increase productivity  ; 
- to  give  the  farmer  a  fair standard of living 
- to assure  the  supply of sufficient food  at 
reasonable prices,  and 
- to stabilise markets. 
. I . .. Goals  which  are not very different  - I  would  have  thought 
from  US  Farm policy,  but  I  get the  impression that there 
is perhaps  less  emphasis  here  on  stability of prices  and 
security of supply  - you  take  the latter for  granted. 
Very  broadly,  these objectives have  been  achieved 
by  fixing  common  floor  prices  for the major part of 
our  farm  production.  But  here,  let me  emphasise  that 
the  CAP  should not be  looked at in  a  purely economic 
context but against  a  social,  political,  cultural and 
environmental  background  as  well.  We  believe that the 
well-being of agriculture is essential to  the  fabric 
of rural life. 
Let  us  now  look briefly at what  the effects of 
achieving these objectives  have  been  - both inside  and 
outside the  Community. 
We  are  frequently  accused  by  our critics of  spending 
limitless  sums  of money  to  encourage  our  farmers  to 
produce  surpluses which  are  then off-loaded onto world 
markets by  r.1eans  of  unfaj_r  export S'lhsidies. 
But let us  examine  the  £acts. 
. I ... 
2. 3. 
First.  As  a  result of the  support we  give our 
farners,  our wheat  pronuction,  for exanple,  increased 
by  29%  over the last decade  - slightly more  than  the 
world  average of  27%.  The  increase here in the  US  in 
the  decade  preceding PIK  was  73%  and  a  lot of that in 
soft wheat.  This  increase is  2  1/2  tines the world 
average.  I  say this in no  accusatory sense,  but 
in an  effort  to set the record straight.  But,  at the 
same  time,  I  cannot resist commenting  that an  increase 
of this magnitude  and particularly in soft wheat  - is 
bound  to  have  had  some  destabilising effect on  the world 
wheat market. 
Furthermore,  the increase  in Community  production has 
been  achieved on  an  acreage that has  remained virtually 
unchanged  for  the last ten to fifteen years. 
Second.  Our  total  farm  spending on all agricultural 
(highest ever) 
products  at about  13.5 bio  $  in 1983/,compared with 
around  20  bio  $  here  - PIK  excluded  - represented less 
than 1/2 of one  per cent of the  Community's  GDP. 
As  to  the  inpact of the  CAP  on  world markets, 
just three general points  : 
. I ... First,  we  are not the only  producers  in the world 
that export products which  are  surplus  to  internal re-
quirements.  Two  thirds of  US  wheat,  for  example,  is 
surplus  to requirements  and  has  to  find  buyers  on  the 
world market.  In addition,  50  per cent of your  cotton 
and  40  per cent of your  soyabeans  are  bought  by  customers 
overseas.  The  Conununity  grows  verv little of the last  2 
and  imports  about  10  to  11  mio  t  of the latter. 
4. 
Second,  International trading rules  formalised in the 
GATT  (General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade)  to which  both 
the  US  ,  the  EC  are signatories,  specifically permit 
the  use of export subsidies,  provided  they are not  used 
to  gain  more  than  an  equitable share of the market. 
We  maintain,  and  trade statistics support our  view,  that 
we  have  kept to  these rules. 
And  last,  but of signal  importance, in spite of the  fact 
that we  have  gone  beyond  self sufficiency,  the  EC  is by  far 
the  American  farmers'  best customer  taking about 1/3 of  US 
farm  exports  and  running  a  massive deficit with you  on  our 
transatlantic agricultural  trade  - 5  bio  $  in  FY  1983  when 
we  took  7. 6  bio  $  worth of US  farm  products  compared  \17i th 
the  5.9  bio  $  you  sold to  Japan  and  the  4.9  bio  $  to  the 
whole  of  South America. 
It seems  to  me  that \17here  the  US  has  lost markets  - the 
major  factors  have  been  the strength of the  US  dollar brought 
about primarily by  a  massive  budget deficit - a  point of view 
. I ... 5. 
now  subscribed  to not only by  the  ITC  but also by  USDA 
in one  of their more  recent publications  - and,  of course 
a  desperate  shortage of funds,particularly in developing 
countries.  This,  of course,  is not  a  very original dia-
gnosis but is perhaps  worth repeating once  again. 
It was  put to  me  recently when  I  suggested that 
the highly valued dollar was  a  much  more  telling factor 
for  the recent decline  in  US  farm exports  than  the  EC's 
export policy  - well  yes it was  conceded  - the dollar 
is responsible  for  about  75%  of the loss.  EC  export 
subsidies  for  25%.  Hhilst no  mathematician,  this  seems 
to  me  to  come  to  100%  and  thus  conveniently disposes  of 
all other factors  - grain embargoes,  world  recession, 
debt problems  not only in the  developing world but in 
the East bloc  as well,  reactions  to textile arrangements, 
big harvests  around  the world  and  so  on. 
This  unorthodox arithmetic also set me  to wondering 
about  another  figure  one  hears  quite  a  lot of  these  days  -
a  figure  that was trotted  out with great confidence  and 
authority at the  American  Farm  Bureau's  Annual  Conference 
two  weeks  ago  in Florida  - and  that is the  6  bio  $  loss 
in  US  farm  export earnings  alleged to be  the result 
of  the  CAP.  I  have  yet to  see  any  serious attenpt to 
show  how  this  figure  is arrived at.  The  danger  is,  hovwver,  that 
often 
if repeated;enough,  it will  come  to  be  accepted  as  fact  . 
. I ... ---------·------
6. 
a  actually 
One  wonders  whether precise calculation/exists and if so 
whether  there is  a  similar one  demonstrating  the  losses 
suffered by other exporters  as  a  result of US  import 
regimes  for  such products  as  sugar,  dairy products,  and 
cotton. 
This  brief overlook of past events  should  not,  however,  be 
taken to  imply that everything is fine  on  the other 
side of the Atlantic  and  that we  have  no  problems  whatso-
ever  in the Community.  Those  of  you  who  follow  develop-
ments  in the  Community  - even at a  very cursory level  -
1 will be well  aware  of the  serious problems  \ve 
currently face.  On  the agriculture front,  we  are both 
of us  - US  and  EC  together  - basically faced  with  the 
same  problem  :  that of  producing larger quantities  than 
markets  can  absorb which,  of course,  is not  the  same  as 
saying that there is too  much  food  in the world. 
Whilst  I  strongly believe that the  CAP  is one of the 
major  achievements  of the  European  Community,  it must  -
like  any other institution or policy,  if it is to  survive, 
and  survive it will  - adapt itself to  changing conditions. 
In  the  Community,  technical advances  and  productivity 
gains  have  meant  that output has  risen more  rapidly 
than  consumption.,  so  that we  have  not only achieved self 
sufficiency in  a  number  of products  but have  moved  beyond. 
Increases  in the  volume  of agricultural production 
have  averaged  between  1  1/2  and  2%  a  year whilst consumption 
has  only risen by  about  1/2%. 
. I ... At  the  same  time,  we  are  running very  low on  cash  -
whether  farm  expenditure represents  less  than  one half 
of one  per cent or not. 
From  1974  to  1979,  expenditure  on  supporting agricul-
tural markets  grew at  23%  per year  - almost  twice  the 
rate of  growth  in our revenue.  For  the next  two  or 
three years  - 1980  to  1982  - expenditure  remained 
fairly stable,  largely because prices  remained  relatively 
high on  world markets.  But since then  expenditure has 
increased sharply  (once  again,  as it has  here),  and 
an  increase of  about  30%  is estimated for  1983. 
Unlike  most  national  governments  - our  Community 
constitution forbids  us  to run  a  budget deficit.  So, 
for  the first time  we  are  running very close  indeed  to 
our  financial  limits. 
There  is very little spare left.  This  chilling 
fact coupled with that of production outpacing consumption 
is the  background  against which  the  Commission  has  pro-
posed  an essential and  very  tough  double barrelmbattery 
of measures  for  the rationalisation of our agriculture. 
7 
The  first was  announced  in July and  concentrated on  a  broad 
adaptation  of our  farm policy  - the  second,  revealed only 
threeweeks  ago,  makes  specific  proposals  as  regards prices 
for  individual  crops. 
. I ... The  main  thrust of the  Commission's  proposals is  : 
- to adapt our agricultural policy to meet  the  changed 
conditions of  the mid  80's 
- to discourage  surplus  faro production  ; 
- to limit Community  spending on  farm  support. 
Time  does  not allow me  to describe  in any detail 
the  full  panoply of measures  which will hit  8  million 
European  farmers  and their families  and  which will 
demand  substantial sacrifices  from  them. 
The  European  farmers'  organisation  - COPA  - said re-
cently that the proposed measures  "would  have  extremely 
serious repercussions  on  all sectors of agricultural 
production  and  would  lead to  a  further substantial fall 
in  farmers  incomes". 
But briefly,  the measures  envisaged are  : 
8 • 
i  production quotas with severe penalties  for  farmers 
vTho  exceed  them  - a  levy equal  to  75%  of the nilk 
target price in  the  case of dairy  farners,  for  example  ; 
ii  extension of guarantee  thresholds  (guarantee 
thresholds put  a  strict ceiling on  the  amount 
of  a  given  crop  a  farraer  may  produce without 
him  having  to contribute  to  the  cost of dis-
posing of  the  surplus)  ; 
. I ... iii  a  tough price policy for  farm  products  which 
will entail reductions  in  some  cases  and  an 
intensification of our efforts to narrow the 
gap  between  our prices and  those of our  com-
petitors  ;  - I  \V'ill  return to these  two  aspects 
in a  moment ••• 
iv  prices  for  some  surplus  commodities  to be 
fixed  for  more  than  one  marketing year 
v  reduced  intervention or  support buying 
vi  - and,  the discontinuation of a  number  of  production 
aids  and  premiums. 
This  briny-s  111~  to  a  r~la:ci  vely minor  elenent of  the 
package  - its external aspects. 
Since our  own  farmers  are being asked  to make  considerable 
sacrifices  and  to limit their production,  the Commission 
feels  that it is not  unreasonable  to  review the  treatment 
of  competing  imports  provided that this is done  strictly 
in  accordance with international trading rules. 
As  I  said earlier,  we  are aiming  to narrou the  gap 
between  our grain prices  and  those of our competitors. 
Such  a  move  will,  in the  long  run,  have  the effect of 
making  grain substitutes much  less attractive.  But 
until that time  and  whilst we  are  implementing.  a  s·::.rict 
guarantee threshold  and  requiring our  grain producers 
to limit their own  production,  it is absolutely essential 
. I . .. 
9. to have  some  effective stabilisation of the  imports of 
grain substitutes. 
10 • 
Our  aim of stabilising imports  of substitutes is not 
a  fiendish  European  plot aimed  specifically at the resi-
dues  of the  US  corn  processing industry.  Substitutes 
are  imported  into the  EC  from  a  wide  range  of  sources 
and  arrangements  have  already been  concluded  for  manioc 
and  for  bran  coming  from  South East Asia  and  elsewhere. 
It is  now  proposed  to stabilise the  imports of other 
major  substitutes  - corn gluten  feed,  for  example  -
a  residue,  to  a  large extent,  from  the corn  sweetener 
industry which,  incidentally,  has  been  able  to  take 
advantage  of  US  support arrangements  for  sugar •  Imports 
of cgf  into  the  EC  have  soared  from  under  700.000  tons  to 
3  1/2 million  tons  since  1974. 
However,  and  I  must  stress this,  what  is being 
proposed  is not hasty unilateral action,  not  a  banning 
of corn gluten  imports  nor  even  a  reduction  in  imports, 
as  one might  gather  from  the  howls  of protest,  but  a 
calm and  reasoned negotiation aimed at a  stabilisation 
of  imports  and  this only after carrying out  the  proce-
dures  laid down  in the  GATT. 
. I .. . 11. 
Two  final observations  about this particular proposal. 
It does  not  seem to  me  unreasonable  to  ask  for  cooperation 
from other countries  in limiting our  import?  of subsitutes 
proauctJ.on 
since adaptation of the  CAP  - with the/cutbacks  envisaged  -
is in their interest since it should  lead to  a  better 
balance  on  world markets  - something the  US  has  been  pressinq 
us  to  do  for years. 
And,  furthermore,  it seems  to  me  that if we  can 
successfully stabilise our  imports  of grain subsitutes, 
then  the  amount  of  European wheat  which  would  be  forced 
onto  world markets  because it had  been  displaced  by  sub-
stitutes in animal  feeding,  would  be  reduced.  A  factor 
which  should not be  without interest to  US  wheat  farmers. 
Such  stabilisation should also help  to  reduce  surpluses  in 
the livestock sector,  particularly in milk. 
The  second measure  which  has  caused  some  concern  here 
in  the u.s.  and  nowhere  more  so  than with  soya  bean  growers, 
is the  proposed consumption  tax on oils  and  fats. 
Let  me  try to  calm these  fears. 
First,  the  tax would  be  non-discriminatory  and 
applied to all oils and  fats,  excluding butter,  whether 
produced  locally or  imported.  Imports  would  be  treated 
no  differently  from  domestic  products.  This  squares 
fully with  international trading  rules. 
. I ... Second,  it is extremely doubtful whether  the  tax 
would  have  any measurable  effect on  the quantities of 
oilseeds  and  beans  inported because: 
(a)  the  low  rate of tax proposed is unlikely 
to alter consumption patterns of oil and  margarine; 
(b)  all other vegetable oils,  including olive 
oil, would  be  taxed at the  same  flat rate which  would 
have  a  proportionally greater effect on  lower priced 
largely 
oils - such as  rapeseed oil produced/from Community 
grown  seed; 
{c)  soya  beans  and  meal  are  imported primarily 
for  animal  feed  and  not  for oil production. 
Third,  and  most  important,  it is no  part of this 
proposal  to subject  3  to  4  bio  $  worth  imports  of  soya 
bean or soya  meal  or any other oil seed to any  restriction, 
tax or  levy.  It is  thus misleading  for others  to  claim that 
these  4  bio  $  exports  are at risk. 
Let  me  now  turn  to  the detailed price proposals  made 
only  a  fortnight or  so  ago/but which  have  to  be  seen  in 
the  framework  of the earlier proposal  made  last July. 
We  have  explained to the  10  national  governments  that 
what is required  from  them is  a  global decision  before 
31  Harch  on  both elements.  There  can  be  no  picking  and 
choosing  from  the list as  one  might  do  from  an  a  la carte 
menu.  tiinisters  can  no  longer put off taking difficult 
decisions. 
Nhat  has  been  proposed  in reality is a  virtual 
price  freeze,  but with variations  - a  few  prices are 
to  be  increased,  some  frozen  and  some  reduced. 
. I . .. Our  price proposals  have  been  adapted  to the different 
market  situations of different products. 
For cereals,  milk,  wine  and  tomatoes,  where 
the market  situation calls for  a  particularly restrictive 
pricing policy,  it is proposed  that prices  for next year 
are  frozen  at their present level  ; 
For  colzaand  rapeseed,  where  the  guarantee 
thresholds  I  mentioned earlier have  been  exceeded  and 
for certain varieties of  tobacco,  price reductions  are 
proposed  ; 
For  sugar,  durum,  wheat,  sunflower  seed,  beef 
and  some  other products  marginal  increases  have  been 
proposed. 
The  average effect of these  measures  overall will 
be to increase prices  by  0.8%  in  Ecu  terms.  But  when 
expressed in national currencies,  which after all is 
what our  farmers  are paid in,  the  result will  be  an 
average drop of  1/2%. 
It is abundantly clear that  some  parts of this 
package will be difficult for  the agricultural  com-
munity to accept,  particularly after an  average decline 
in  EC  farm  incomes  of  about  6%  last year.  But it has 
to  be  pointed out that the  CAP  has  helped  to  protect 
our  farmers  from  the worst effects of  the  economic 
crisis.  Farm  incomes  in  some  other parts of the world 
declined more  steeply· last year. 
. I ... 14. 
It is also  abundantly clear that the market  situation 
for  many  of our  farm  products is extremely difficult and 
in milk particularly production has  gone  far  beyond  what 
the market  can handle.  Public authorities cannot  be 
expected  to  take charge of all these products  for  which 
there is no  market.  The  CAP  cannot continue  on  such  a 
basis  - one  which  is neither economically  sound  nor 
financially acceptable. 
However,  this is not to  say  that these proposals 
for  European  agriculture are merely  a  list of price 
savings  to the benefit of our hard pressed budget  and 
at the  expense  of the  farm  community.  They  have  to  be 
seen  as  part of  a  coherent,  overall policy for  the de-
velopment not the dismantling of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy. 
Previous  to the  tabling of  these  proposals  by  the 
Commission,  and  even after,  there had  been  a  great deal 
of complaining along the  lines  that it was  only  the  US 
that had  adjusted to changed market conditions  - through 
PIK,  for  example  - and  that the  EC  had  gone  merrily on 
its way  with its foot  on  the  accelerator.  I  would  just 
like to  comment  that whilst  the  EC  had  not,  at that time, 
embarked  on  anything quite so  sensational as  PIK  - which 
in  any  case would  not make  sense  in Europe  which is short 
of  farm  land  - we  had  taken  a  number  of measures  in our 
discreet European  way.  For  example,  we  had  substantially 
increased our wheat  stocks  by  something over  70%,  that 
. I ... ---~e 
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we  honoured our  undertaking not  to  increase our  share of 
the world wheat  and wheat  flour market,  that our wheat 
acreage  had  been  reduced slightly whilst other major 
exporters  - with the exception of the  US  - had  increased 
theirs  and  that we  had  reduced our  sugar production by 
about  20%  over  the  last two  years. 
It is on  the  basis of these  measures  already taken 
and  even  more  on  the  tough wide  ranging package  I  have 
just briefly described to you that I  maintain  they should 
not  be  seen  as  an  attempt to shuffle off our  problems  on 
to our  friends  and allies  and  ask  them  to extricate us 
from  our difficulties.  They  are  a  serious  and honest 
effort to adapt our  own  farm  policy to meet  the  vastly 
changed conditions  of the  mid  80's  and which will  demand 
much effort and  considerable sacrifice at home. 
As  a  result,  the  CAP  will  be  given  the  opportunity to 
continue  to ensure  food  supply  and price stability,  to 
give our  farmers  a  reasonable,  but not excessive,  return 
and yet permit us  to play  a  positive,  cooperative  and 
responsible role in  world  trade.  So  that together 
we  can  defend  - and vigilant defence will be  required  to 
thwart  the designs  of  the  growing  ranks  of protectionists  -
maintain  and  develop  the one  world  trading  system which 
has  fostered over  the last 30  to  40  years  the  greatest 
increase in mutual  prosperity since  recorded history began. 
*  *  *  * 
DR/sbh 
15. 